2019年翻译资格考试三级笔译练习题：房地产金融市场
2019-07-29 21:20:25   来源：学苑网   评论：0 点击：

　　美国未能汲取“次贷"危机的教训。不仅次贷危机本身的发生过程和原因值得关注，其所揭示的更广泛议題同样值得考察。我是一名有理论功底的经济学家，20多年前便开始研究美国房地产金融市场。

　　Nobel laureate Ro, Shiller and i separately made proposals to reduce systemic risk in the market. Yet our reform efforts went nowhere during the good times. We could not grab scarce public, press, or political attention with the claim that an apparently well- functioning system was profoundly flawed.

　　诺贝尔奖获得者佑特.席和我分别提出降低市场系统风险的建议。但是，在经济繁荣景气的时代，我们的改革提议白費唇舌。我们认为，当时表面运转良好的市场系统，实际上却千疮百孔，公众、传媒和政界对我们的观点置若罔闻。

　　Naively as it turned out, we each believed that the housing finance crash might finally cause more fundamental questions to be asked. After all, our ideas on risk sharing were directly relevant and would have lessened the impact of the crash. We each made specific proposals to speed recovery from the crash. For a while it seemed as if there would be real progress. Our hope was short-lived. Nothing positive has come out of the “subprime" crisis. The changes that have been made treat the nature and ignore the illness.

　　我们天真地以为，房地产金融危机也许终于会让人们提出更根本、更核心的问题。毕竟，我们关于分担风险的想法与此直接相关，并且会减轻危机的破坏力。我们分别提出危机后加快复苏进程的具体建议。曾有一度，我们似乎真的取得了进步，但我们的希望只是昙花一现：次貸危机没有带来任何积极的改变。所有的改革一直是治标不治本。

　　The US housing finance system is in worse shape than ever. The policy reform process is broken, and there is no quick fix sight. The breakdown of the reform process is simple to understand as it is tragic. Public servants can all too easily prevent experts from judging their performance. This leaves an inexpert press and a readily distracted public as the only sources of reformist pressure. The press commentates on policy responses based on ideological mandates from an ideological readership. The public tweets approval. Unexamined, institutions and opinions continue to ossify.

　　目前美国房地产金融系统的状况空前恶劣。政策改革进程中断，也看不到能快速解决问题的补救办法。改革进程停滞的原因很容易理解，也很可悲。公务员很轻易地就能规避专家评判其工作表现，这使得不专业的媒体和容易分心的公众成为仅有的改革压力的来源。媒体从意识形态受众的角度对基于意识形态的政策反馈发表评论。公众在推特发文表示赞成，而机构和舆论不经斟酌，继续固守成規。

　　The problem is deep and pervasive. Many policy-makers have much to fear from exposing their activities to experts who might attract public attention to their failings. Without experts, their performance simply cannot be assessed. This liberates spinners, which is positive for most in the press whose technical training leaves them unable to sort through the competing claims of knowledgeable experts and less knowledgeable policy-makers and pundits.

　　问题非常严重，而且普遍存在。许多决策者非常担心把活动曝光给专家后可能使民众注意到他们的失败。没有专家，他们的表现便无法得到评估。这让编故事的人获得了解放-大多数媒体中都确实存在这样的角色-他们所接受的技术训练有限，无法分辨博学的专家和不那么博学的决策者以及权威们各持己见的说法。

　　Even when reform is called for, it is impossible to effectively monitor implementation when experts are kept at arms’ length. Let me return briefly to the case of US housing finance policy. One must predict that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA will survive unscathed. Without fundamental re-thinking, risks will be allowed to multiply unseen. The seeds are even now being sowed for the housing crash of 2025 - 35 and the bailout of 2027-37.

　　即使民众要求变革，如果专家只是隔山打牛，也不可能有效监控改革的实施。让我迅速回到美国房地产金融政策一事吧。人们预测房利美公司、房地美公司和联邦住房管理局肯定会安然无恙地度过危机：但是如果人们没有根本性的反思，风险仍会在不知不觉中蔓延，甚至现在就已经埋下了2025至2035年房地产市场暴跌和2027至2037年救助的种子。